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THE INCAPACITATION OF THE CHRONIC THUG
STEVE VAN DINE,- JOHN P. CONRAD"

AND SIMON DINITZ***

conclusions, but van den Haag s thought that the
"If I could get just 200 guys off my streets and finding justified the innovation of "post-punishkeep them off," a metropolitan police chief once ment incapacitation." Wilson extended the Wolfsaid, "I could cut the crime rate in halfi!i His view gang findings to reach his conclusion that:
has been echoed by many frustrated colleagues. It "Wicked people exist. Nothing avails
' 6 except to set
people.
innocent
from
apart
them
has become an article of faith that there exists a
The expectation that the volume of crime can
small, hard core group of chronic criminals who
are responsible for a vastly disproportionate share be reduced by incapacitation has begun to find
of the serious felonies committed in our cities. administrative and legislative expression. The Law
However, while this notion may be plausible, it has Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
has sponsored a Career Criminal Program under
never been proved. In this article, we shall attempt
to show that although there may be some support which special units are set up in the offices of
metropolitan district attorneys to expedite the prosfor the idea, there is less support than is commonly
ecution of defendants accused of the repeated combelieved. The question then becomes, how much
crime can be prevented by incapacitating chronic mission of major felonies. Mandatory sentences
criminals? To be as specific as possible, we will have been debated in most state legislatures in
limit the term incapacitationto the custodial control recent years, and have been statutorially authorized in many. Experimentation is beginning with
of an offender for a protracted term during which
he will be unable to commit a crime affecting the the prosecution of repetitively violent juvenile offenders.
general public.
This shift of policy and practice calls for empirSome support for the notion of the chronic thug
ical
scrutiny. Although there are numerous and
has been found in the landmark research of Wolf2
complex
questions to be answered, the fundamengang, Figlio, and Sellin. In that study, the researchers reviewed the records of 9,945 boys who tal issue of the potential effectiveness of incapaciwere "born in 1945 who resided in the city of tation in the reduction of the volume of crime is
Philadelphia at least from their tenth until their open to study. In this article we shall report our
eighteenth birthday."3 Two-thirds of the cohort explorations of this issue by considering the incahad no contact with the police. Of the remainder, pacitating effects of. several different sentencing
627 boys had five or more arrests before the age of policies, all of them much more severe than any
eighteen. This number was only 6% of the cohort now in force. Early7 findings of our research were
and 18% of the delinquent portion. But these boys published in 1977. That study was limited to the
committed over one-half of the recorded delin-4 effect of incapacitation as a crime reduction strategy when imposed on a universe of accused adult
quencies and two-thirds of the violent offenses.
Wolfgang and his associates avoided any policy violent offenders. In the next section of this paper
we shall summarize the findings in that report. In
* Research Coordinator, Ohio Adult Parole Authority;
the remainder of this paper we will report the
Research Associate, Academy for Contemporary Probresults of our most recent research and will relate
lems, Columbus, Ohio.
** Senior Fellow, Academy for Contemporary Prob- it to the growing literature on incapacitation.
lems, Columbus, Ohio.
SUMMARY OF EARLIER WORK DONE
*** Professor of Sociology, Ohio State University; SenIn
The
Incapacitation of the Dangerous Offender: A
ior Fellow, Academy for Contemporary Problems, CoStatistical
Experiment,"
we investigated the impact of
lumbus, Ohio.
5
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A VERY
OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 244 (1975).
6
INTRODUCTION

2 M. WOLFGANG,

R. FIGLIO, & T.

SELLIN, DELINQUENCY

IN A
3 BIRTH COHORT (1972).

Id. at 27.

4Wolfgang,

Crime in a Birth Cohort, in

AND JUSTICE ANNUAL 112

(1973).

ALDINE CRIME

j. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 209 (1975).
7Van Dine, Dinitz, & Conrad, The Incapacitation of the
DangerousOffender: A StatisticalExperiment, 14 J. RESEARCH
CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 22 (1977).
8

Id.

VAN DINE, CONRAD AND DINITZ

severe and unvaried sentencing policies on a cohort
of accused adult violent offenders. Each of the 342
members of the cohort was charged in 1973 by the
various police departments in Franklin County,
Ohio, with the commission of a violent felony.
Each case was completed during that year by
conviction on the original or a modified charge, by
dismissal, or by a prosecutor's plea of nolle prosequi.
The distribution of these 342 defendants by
offense charged is shown in Table 1. In Table 2,
we show the total number of violent crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
1973, with clearance by arrest and by conviction,
as found for the study cohort of 342.
The central question for our attention concerns
the extent to which the 2,892 violent crimes re. ported to the FBI would have been reduced had a
uniform sanction of incarceration been imposed at
the time of the last previousfelony conviction, thereby
incapacitating the offender at the time of his 1973
crime. We are here substituting a hypothetical
situation, in which severe and uniform sentences of
imprisonment would have been administered, for
the mixture of sanctions that was actually imposed.
Our universe consisted of all adults arrested in
1973 in Franklin County for violent crimes. The
basic information was obtained from the Clerk of
the Court of Common Pleas. Working with the
Identification Bureau of the Columbus Police De-

partment, we collected the FBI arrest histories and
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background information. We particularly scrutinized the data to establish the following information as to each case:
(1) Was there a previous felony conviction?
(2) Were any such convictions for violent crimes?
(3) When was the last felony conviction recorded
prior to the 1973 conviction?
(4) Would the imposition of a three to five year

sentence for the earlier violation have prevented
the 1973 offense?
The data for each case in the cohort were reviewed to establish the answer to each of these
questions. By charting each criminal career in this
manner, we could determine the effect of various
hypothetical sentencing policies.
We compared the effects of several different
sentencing policies. Mandatory sentences of three
and five years were imposed retrospectively, with
various contingencies in the defendants' records

calling for the incapacitating sanction. The most
stringent policy required that any person convicted
of any felony, violent or not, would be sentenced to

five full, or net, calendar years in prison. (None of
our hypothetical policies allowed for early release
for good time served, for parole, or for any modification of the sentence imposed except preconviction jail time.) We measured the effects of this
policy using three different suppositions.
First, we assumed that the crimes on which the
defendant was charged were correct and that he

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF

1973

ADULT COHORT BY CRIME CHARGED, NUMBER OF CRIMES CHARGED, CONVICTIONS RECEIVED,
AND NUMBER OF CRIMES CLEARED BY CONvIcTION

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Multiple Offense (Two of the Above)
Total

Persons
Arrested

Crimes Charged,
By
Categories
of
Persons
Arrested

Perons
Convicted

ConvictionCounts

36
128
79
49
50*
342

45
269
111
66
147**
638

18
77
23
28
20***
166

20
100
24
30
57****
231

* Of the 50 persons, 22 were charged with robbery-assault offenses, 12 with robbery-sex offenses, 6 with murder/
manslaughter-robbery offenses, 6 with murder/manslaughter-assault offenses, 3 with assault-sex offenses, and 1 with
murder/manslaughter-sex offenses.
** The 50 persons charged with multiple offenses generated 147 charges, of which there were 17 murder charges,
55 robbery charges, 32 sex offenses, and 43 assault offenses.
*** Of the 20 persons with multiple offenses, 6 each were convicted for robbery-assault offenses and with murder/
manslaughter-assault offenses, 5 for murder/manslaughter-robbery offenses, and I offender for each of three combinations: murder/manslaughter-sex offenses, robbery-sex offenses, assault-sex offenses.
**** The 20 offenders convicted on multiple offenses generated 57 conviction-counts, of which there were 14
murder conviction-counts, 20 robbery conviction-counts, 5 sex offense conviction-counts, and 18 assault convictioncounts.
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TABLE 2
TOTAL RECORDED VIOLENT OFFENSES AND VIOLENT OFFENSES CLEARED, FRANKLIN COUNTY

Reported Violent
UCR Crimes
Franklin County,
1973*

Cleared by Arrest

Cleared by Conviction

% of UCR

N

1973*

N

% of UCR

Murder/Manslaughter
65
62
95.4
34
52.3
Robbery
1,554
324
20.8
120
7.7
Sex Offenses (Violent)
326
143
43.9
29
8.9
Assault
947
109
11.5
48
5.1
Total
2,892
638
22.1
231
8.0
* UCR denotes Uniform Crimes Reports.
** The cohort is composed of all Franklin County adults charged with a violent felony whose case was completed
in 1973. While the cases were completed in 1973, only about one-half of the crimes actually occurred in 1973, most
of the restjoccurring in 1972. Thus, we chose to use the UCR statistics listed above, representing an average between
the 1972 and 1973 Franklin County statistics.

had been found guilty in every case. Accepting
that supposition, we found that at least 111 violent
crimes of the 2,892 reported in 1973 would have
been prevented by the five-year sentence. That was
a reduction of 3.8% in the volume of violent crime
(see Table 5). These crimes were committed by
sixty-three persons. Obviously, an unknown and
unknowable fraction of the total number of crimes
reported would have been prevented by the incarceration of these 63 offenders; the 111 crimes with
which they were charged constitute the verified
minimum number for which they were responsible.
But there were 279 persons left in the cohort of 342
who could not have been prevented from committing either the crimes with which they were charged
or those which they committed but on which they
were not charged by the police. Whatever the total
number of crimes that these 279 persons actually
committed, none could have been prevented by an
incapacitating sentence because none of these offenders had been convicted on a felony charge
during the previous five years.
Second, we applied a more restrictive measure to
the cohort. We proceeded on the supposition that
we could be certain a crime was prevented only if
the person charged was found guilty of the crime.
Obviously, this is a more restrictive supposition
than the one above, where we assumed that arrest
implied guilt. By this yardstick, only 48 (or 1.7%)
of the 2,892 crimes committed in 1973 would have
been prevented. These forty-eight crimes were committed by thirty-six persons (see Table 5). Again,
it is reasonable to suppose that these thirty-six
persons must have been responsible for more than
the forty-eight crimes with which they were
charged in 1973, but we cannot know how many
more.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBTrrIoN BY NUMBER OF PRIOR VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT CONVICTIONS OF 342 ACCUSED ADULT VIOLENT
OFFENDERS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO, 1973. PRIOR
ADULT FELONY CONVICTIONS ONLY
Number of

Prior Non-Violent
Convictions

0

Number of Prior Violent

0

Convictions
1
2

18
7
3

-

2

232
47
18

3

6

2

4

1

---

1

5

Total

2

Total
3

-

1
1
1

253
55
22

-

1

9

4

342

2---

306

2

30

2

Third,we noted that of the 342 persons charged,
63 could have been prevented from the commission
of whatever crimes they committed. This meant
that a policy of incapacitation for five years would
have reduced the number of persons charged in
1973 by 18.4%. The 111 crimes they committed
constituted 17.4% of the 638 offenses with which
our cohort of 342 was charged.
These three measures reflected various ways of
calculating the reduction of crime attributable to
an incapacitating sentence of five years imposed on

all persons in the group who had been guilty of a
previous felony during the period 1968-73. We

concluded that these results did not justify the
extraordinarily severe sentencing policy on which
the experiment was based.
A sampling of a universe can never do more than
approach a representation of reality. The reality
which this experiment was designed to approach
was the answer to the question of how many of the
2,892 violent offenses reported by the Franklin
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County law enforcement agencies to the FBI might
have been prevented had a five year sentence been
imposed on their perpetrators at the time of their
last previous conviction. This question is unanswerable. However, this study establishes some of
the minimums and also establishes a reciprocal
figure, the minimum number of offenses that could
not have been prevented by this draconian sentencing structure.
OTHER INFERENCES, OTHER INTERPRETATIONS

Our earlier article had been preceded by a small
but distinguished group of studies consisting of
models constructed from speculative data. Studies
t
by Ehrlich, 9 Clarke, ° and Greenberg, had converged on the position that incarceration, as presently implemented, made only a small reduction
in the crime rate through incapacitation. But an
analysis of New York City crime rates by Shinnar
and Shinnar,12 based on speculative estimates of
the numbers of crimes committed by various classes
of offenders and the velocity at which they are
committed, concluded that much more severe policies than are now in force-mandatory sentences
of five years for the violent index offenses and three
years for burglary-would reduce the rate of commission of these "safety" offenses by as much as
80%.13 This study was the principal conceptual
advocacy of a policy of rigorsupport for Wilson's
14
ous incapacitation.
Our article' 5 made the essential point that if five
year sentences were imposed on all members of the
1973 cohort at the time of their last previous felony
arrest, only 3.8% of the violent offenses reported in
1973 could have been prevented. Our critics argued
that this was much too low an estimate. For ex17
ample, Boland 16 and Palmer and Salimbene con-
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TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF PRIOR VIOLENT AND NON-

VIOLENT CONVICTIONS OF

342

ACCUSED ADULT VIOLENT

OFFENDERS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO,

1973.

PRIOR

ADULT AND JUVENILE FELONIES

Number or
Prior Non-Violent
Convictions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total

Number of Prior Violent
Convictions
2
3
0
1
181
41
32
12
7
3
2
1
1
280

15
7
8
9
2
3
1
1
46

Total

3
1
3
2
1

1
1
1
2
1

200
50
44
25
11
6
3
2

10

6

342

tended that we had ignored the large number of
uncleared crimes in the total reported to the FBI.
Instead of using the numbers of crimes as the point
of departure in our analysis, they stated that we
would have done better to stress the proportion of
the individuals accused who would have been prevented by incapacitating sentences-which produces a figure of 17.4% of the 1973 charges that
would have been prevented.
18
In our response to their criticism, we acknowledged that the rock-bottom figure of 3.8% was just
that-a minimum. The sixty-three persons who
would have been prevented from committing these
crimes probably committed other crimes for which
they were neither suspected, arrested nor charged.
We went on to say that we were sure that the figure
of 17.4% was too high an estimate of the fraction
of the total number of violent offenses that could
have been prevented. About one-fourth of the violent crimes reported in 1973 were committed by
9 Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretjuveniles who could not have been subjected to the
ical andEmpiricalInvestigation, 81J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973).
'o Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation:Does Incarceration
criminal sanctions we had suggested. We went on
ofJuvenile Offenders Reduce Crime?, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 528
to observe that over one-half of the adults who had
(1974).
previously arrested on felony charges were
been
It Greenberg, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment:
not found guilty of any offense. Clearly, an incaSome Estimates, 9 L. & Soc'v REV. 541 (1975).
12Shinnar & Shinnar, The Effects of the CriminalJustice pacitation policy could not be applied to them.
System on the Control of Crime: A Quantitative Approach, 9 L.
Since the presentation of our article, two new
& Soc'Y REV. 581 (1975).
have been published addressing the effecstudies
'3Id. at 607.
tiveness of incapacitation. Petersilia and GreenJ. WILSON, supra note 6, at 200-02.
' 5 See Vahi Dine, Dinitz & Conrad, supra note 7.
wood, 19 using methods similar to ours, tried to
16Boland, Incapacitation of the Dangerous Offender: The
'8 Van Dine, Dinitz, & Conrad, Response to Our Critics,
Arithmetic is Not So Simple, 15 J. RESEARCH CRIME &
14J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 135 (1978).
DELINQUENCY 126 (1978).
1
17Palmer & Salimbene, The Incapacitation of the DangergPetersilia & Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences:
Projected Effects on Crime and Prison Populations, 69 J.
Their
ous Offender: A Second Look, 14 J. RESEARCH CRIME &
CRIM. L. & C. 604 (1978).
DELINQUENCY 130 (1978).
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TABLE 5
THE IMPACT OF OPTION I* ON THE

AMOUNT

OF CRIME PREVENTED, ARREST LEVEL, AND CONVICrION LEVEL, ADULT
RECORDS ONLY

Persons
Prevented
Persons
Arrested

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Multiple Offenses (Two of the
Above)
Totals
* Option I: a five year net prison

36
128
79
49
40

N

8
35
8
1
11

Counts Prevented

Franklin Co.,
1973 UCR,
Violent

%of

Aretd

22.2
27.3
10.1
2.0
22.0

Conviction Level

Arrest Level

Crimes

65
1554
326
927
-

N

%of UCR

N

%of UCR

18
65
22
6

27.7
4.2
6.7
0.6

9
28
5
6

13.8
1.8
1.5
0.6

-

-

-

-

342
63
18.4
2892
111
3.8
48
1.7
term imposed after any felony conviction; no violent felonies are required.

TABLE 6
THE IMPACT OF OPTION

IV

ON THE AMOUNT OF CRIME PREVENTED, ARREST LEVEL, AND CONVICTION LEVEL,

ADDITIONAL PERSONS, ARRESTS, AND CONVICTIONS PREVENTED WHEN JUVENILE RECORDS ARE ADDED
Persons

Prevented
Persons
Arrested

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Multiple Offenses (Two of the
Above)
Totals
* Option I: a five year net prison

36
128
79
49
50

N
3
16
5
0
6

Aretd
Arrested
8.6
12.5
6.3
0
12.0

Counts Prevented

Franklin Co.,
1973 UCR,
Violent
Crimes
Cri

N

%of UCR

N

%ofUCR

65
1554
326
927

3
39
15
7

4.6
2.5
4.6
0.8

3
17
5
5

4.6
1.1
1.5
0.5

-

Conviction Level

Arrest Level

-

-

-

-

342
30
8.8
2892
64
2.2
30
1.0
term imposed after any felony conviction; no violent felonies are required.

estimate the effects of incapacitating sentences on
Petersilia and Greenwood acknowledged that
a cohort of felony offenders in Denver during the the cost of such a policy would be high. Their
period 1968-70. Their work differed from ours in calculations suggested that the prison population
two significant respects. The Denver cohort in- would increase by 450% to effect a reduction in the
cluded persons found guilty of any charge, even a violent crime rate of 31%. The same policies of
misdemeanor. Ignoring specific charges, they esti- incapacitation were relatively more successful at
mated the fraction of the cohort that would have preventing property and less serious felonies. The
been prevented from committing the 1968-70 authors calculated that mandatory imprisonment
crimes by the imposition of an incapacitating sen- for five years would have prevented, through intence at the last previous conviction. By their test, capacitation, 42% of the burglaries and 47% of the
31% of the Denver cohort would have been pre- other crimes in the study period.
vented from committing their 1968-70 crimes by
Cohen 2o has written an elaborate review of the
the imposition of an incapacitating sentence of five articles by Ehrlich, Greenberg, Clarke, and Shinyears at the time of their last previous conviction. nar and Shinnar. According to Cohen, Ehrlich
They reasoned that this policy would have pre- understated the potential of incapacitation, but
vented a similarly high percentage of the violent
20 Cohen, The IncapacitativeEffect ofImprisonment: A Crit1968-70 crimes, on the assumption that those ap- ical Review of the Literature, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACIprehended are representative of those committing TATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
violent crimes.
ON THE CRIME RATES 187 (1978).

VAN DINE, CONRAD AND DINITZ
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TABLE 7
THE

IMPACT OF OPTION

I*

ON THE

AMOUNT OF CRIME PREVENTED, ARREST LEVEL, AND CONVICTION LEVEL, ADULT
RECORDS AND JUVENILE RECORDS*

Persons
Arrested

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Multiple Offenses (Two of the
Above)
Totals

36
128
79
49
50

Persons Prevented

N
11
50
14
1
17

%of
Arrested
30.6
39.1
17.7
2.0
34.0

Franklin
1973 UCR,
Violent
Crimes

Counts Prevented
Arrest Level

Conviction Level

N

%of UCR

N

%of UCR

65
1554
326
927

21
104
37
13

32.3
6.7

12
45

11.3

10

1.4

11

18.5
2.9
3.1
1.2

-

-

-

-

-

342
93
27.2
2892
175
6.1
78
2.7
Option I: a five year net prison term imposed after any felony conviction; no violent felonies are required.
** Table 7 is the total of Tables 5 and 6.
*

Shinnar and Shinnar inflated it. She noted that
Shinnar and Shinnar had based their analysis on
the diminished certainty of incarceration during
the period 1940-70 to account for the rise in crime
rates. This correlation over-simplified the reality
and ignored other possible influences on the crime
rate, including the possibility that the individual
crime rate has increased. Cohen further suggested
that if the prosecutors and courts in New York City

are already overloaded, as the Shinnar team recognized, the changes that they proposed in the
sentencing structure would increase the difficulty
of gaining a conviction and prevent the increase in
incapacitation that the Shinnars desire.
Cohen also commented on an unpublished Hudson Institute discussion paper by Marsh and

Singer.2 Using hypothetical information on the
rates at which a distribution of robbers committed
their crimes, Marsh and Singer estimated that from
35-48% of New York robberies might be prevented
through an extension of imprisonment by one year.
Due to the very tentative nature of the study and
the hypothetical data used, these results must be
viewed with some skepticism. However, their calculations suggested that studies of the impact of
incapacitation will inevitably underestimate the
amount of crime prevented if the study uses only
an average rate of the commission of crime. Cohen
concurred with their analysis in this regard. The
Greenberg and the Shinnar and Shinnar projections both were based on the use of an average
crime rate.
While it did not focus on incapacitation, one
other recent study did offer findings pertinent to
21 Marsh & Singer, Soft Statistics and Hard Questions
(1972) (Hudson Institute Discussion Paper HI-1712-DP).

this study. Wolfgangss reported on the work of
CollinsE who followed until age thirty a 10%
random sample from the Philadelphia birth cohort
of 1945. Collins estimated that four or five index
offenses might be prevented for each juvenile index
offender placed into custody. He also concluded
that each offender between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-five who is incarcerated for a year
would be prevented from committing three to three
and one-half offenses. These figures are not used to
project the overall effectiveness of a policy of incapacitation.
THE EXPANDED STUDY

We shall now report the findings of further
studies based upon our earlier work discussed in
the first section of this article. At the conclusion of
our earlier work several important questions were
left unanswered. The most significant of these questions concerned the extent to which the crime rate
would be affected if a policy of incapacitation were
to be applied to juvenile offenders.
Review of juvenile records would resolve two
problems. First, some of those adults charged with
1973 violent offenses were in the eighteen to
twenty-three year old age range. An earlier felony
could have been committed while the individual
was still under juvenile jurisdiction. Had an incapacitation policy been imposed on these younger
offenders, how many more of the 342 cohort members would have been prevented from the commis2M.
Wolfgang, Front Boy to Man-From Delinquency to Crime (Sept. 19-20 1977) (paper presented at
the National Symposium on the Serious Juvenile Offender).
23
J. Collins, Chronic Offender Careers (Nov. 4 1976)
(paper presented at the American Society of Criminology,
Tucson, Ariz.).
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30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

PENALTY
# felonies required
# violent felonies
required.

5 yrs
1 felony
0 violent

5
2
0

5
3
0

3
1
0

5
1
1

5
3
1

3
3
0

* The bottom light portion of each bar represents percent of population prevented

with adult records only used. 7he upper shaded portion of each bar represents
an additional portion of the cohort which would be prevented if juvenile felony
records are used.

CHART 1
Proportion of 342 accused violent offenders prevented through seven sentencing policies. Adult records only, or
with juvenile records added.

sion of their 1973 violent offenses? Second, some of
the offenders responsible for violent crimes in 1973
were juveniles and therefore outside the original
cohort, but responsible for a share of the 2,892
violent offenses reported to the FBI. If they had
been incapacitated on the same basis as the adult
offenders, how many of those reported offenses
would have been prevented?
At this point we must disclaim advocacy of long
terms of incapacitation for juvenile offenders of
any kind. Nonetheless, such radical changes in the
administration ofjustice have been urged, and our
study would not be complete without an assessment
of their potential consequences. It will be seen that
our findings indicate that some further crime reduction would occur from such policies, but at a
formidable social and economic cost.
The two studies described are not completely
congruent temporally or geographically. The ju-

venile cohort added to the study is limited to
persons committing their crimes in Columbus
proper during 1973, whereas the original adult
study drew on Franklin County records-of which
Columbus criminal cases constituted about 90% of
the total. For convenience, we shall join the two
studies, but the reader must recognize that there is
an undesirable though unavoidable fuzziness introduced.
Another problem encountered in creating the
juvenile cohort arose from the informal procedures
customarily used in thejuvenile justice system. For
example, it was not uncommon to find in the
juvenile cohort an aggravated assault charge disposed of under the heading "Reprimand and
Release." We counted it as a conviction and subject
to an incapacitative sentence. That had the effect
of increasing the impact of an incapacitation policy, but it was not technically a finding of guilty.

VAN DINE, CONRAD AND DINITZ
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TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF COHORT OF JUVENILES CHARGED WITH VIOLENT FELONIES IN COLUMBUS,

OHIO IN

1973,

BY CRIME OF

INDICTMENT, NUMBER OF CRIMES IN INDICTMENT, JUVENILES CONVICTED, AND NUMBER OF CONVICTION-COUNTS

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Violent Sex Offenses
Assault
Multiple Offense (Two of the
Above)
Total

Persons Arrested

Arrest Charges

Persons Convicted

Conviction-Counts

2
87
16
18
3

2
111
18
23
-

1
63
10
16
I

1
74
11
20
-

126

154

92

106

TABLE 9
TOTAL REPORTED VIOLENT OFFENSES, VIOLENT OFFENSES, CLEARED BY JUVENILE ARREST AND BY JUVENILE

CONVICTON, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1973

Reported Violent
UCR Crimes,

Cleared by Arrest

Cleared by Conviction

Columbus, Ohio, 1973

N

% of UCR

N

% of UCR

64
1508
295
755
2622

2
111
18
23
154

3.1
7.4
6.1
3.0
5.9

1
74
11
20
106

1.6
4.9
3.7
2.6
4.0

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Total

Such decisions have to be made in most social
research; we tried to be consistent in the direction
in which they were made.
We now report on seven hypothetical sentencing
policies. As in the study of the adult cohort, we
applied each of these alternative policies to any
juvenile offense committed before 1973:
Option I: Five year prison term imposed for any
felony conviction.
Option II: Five year prison-term imposed for the
second and all succeeding felony convictions, whether violent or not. (On
the first conviction the penalty structure is the same as in the existing law.)
Option III: Five year prison term imposed for the
third and any succeeding felony conviction, whether violent or not. (On
the first two convictions the penalty
structure is the same as in existing
law.)
Option IV: Three year prison term for any felony
conviction, whether violent or not.

Option V: Five year prison term for the first violent felony conviction. Further, a five
year prison term imposed for each subsequent conviction of any
whether violent or not.

felony,

Option VI: Five year prison term for the second
felony conviction if one of the two
previous convictions was for a violent

felony. Five year prison term for any
subsequent violent or non-violent felony conviction. For offenders convicted of non-violent felonies only, the
penalty structure is the same as in
existing law.
Option VII: Three year prison term for the second
and any subsequent felony conviction.
(On the first conviction the penalty
structure is the same as in existing
law.)
ADULT OFFENDERS WITH JUVENILE RECORDS

To make the necessary connections between the
study of the adult records and the new study of the
juvenile files, we reproduce in Tables 1 and 2 the
data describing the original adult cohort of 342.
Table 1 shows the cohort members distributed by
the felonies with which they were charged and the
number of counts pressed against them. The numbers of convictions are also shown. The low conviction rate for multiple offenders is misleading; some
of those accused were convicted of only one crime
and were reclassified as single offenders.
In Table 2, we present the number of violent
crimes reported in Franklin County in 1973, and
show the number of crimes in each category cleared
by arrest and by conviction. Note that 22. 1% of the
crimes committed were cleared by arrest; this rate
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is not unusually low when compared with that in
other jurisdictions. The 8.0% rate of clearance by
conviction is also consistent with that obtained in
similar jurisdictions. The shrinkage must be attributed to plea bargaining, over-charging, or charges
for which no conviction was obtained.

In Table 3, we summarize the adult felony records of the 342 cohort members, classifying the

offenses by violent and non-violent felony convictions. In this cohort, 110, or 32.2% had prior adult
felony convictions, of which thirty-six were violent.

Only four of the 342 had three previous violent
felony convictions; only two more had two such
convictions. The most felonious member of the
cohort had three violent and three non-violent
convictions. Few of the 342 members of the cohort

could have been incapacitated for the crimes they
committed by an incapacitation policy focused on
repetitive violence. Only six of the 342-1.8%had more than a single violent conviction. By

imposing life time incapacitation on all thirty-six
members with records of a- violent conviction,
10.5% of the cohort would have been prevented
from the commission of their 1973 crimes. A policy
of incapacitating all persons with any felony record
would have reached 110 persons-32.2% of the
cohort.
Table 4 presents the felony records of the 342
adult offenders when both adult and juvenile convictions are included. Almost half, 161 of the cohort
of 342, or 47.1%, now show felony conviction records. In the group thus expanded, sixteen (4.7%)
had two or more violent felony convictions, and
sixty-two (18.1%) had at least one such conviction.

Collectively, the cohort had 186 adult felony convictions, but there were 225juvenile convictions on
their records.24
In Table 5, we show the impact of the most
severe sentencing policy, Option I, when it is applied to adult convictions and records only. Tables
6 and 7 present the increased incapacitating effect
About three-fourths-or 254-of the cohort had a
Columbus background. The rest had either lived elsewhere as juveniles, or the record was blank as to early
24

residence. For offenders older than twenty-three at the
time of the 1973 charge, a record of youthful criminality
in another jurisdiction would be unimportant for the
purposes of this study, since there is no national system
for reporting juvenile offenses, and the existence of a
previous juvenile offense could not be brought to the

attention of the court. For the young adult offender
between eighteen and twenty-three, a five year incapacitation sentence imposed anywhere would have prevented the 1§73 Columbus offense. However, we doubt
that our findings are seriously distorted by our inability
to take this possibility into account.

produced by applying Option I to the 342 while
juvenile or adult. If it is assumed that all arrests
should have resulted in convictions, the number of
persons thus incapacitated rises from sixty-three to
ninety-three, from 18.4% to 27.2% of the cohort.
This level of incapacitation would have prevented
175 offenses-or 6.1% of the 2,892 violent crimes
reported. If Option I is applied only to those
convicted on the 1973 felony charge, only seventyeight, or 2.7% of the reported offenses would have
been prevented. Either way these results could only
be achieved by drastic and costly changes in the
criminal justice system, and by accepting a very
large increase in the number of persons incarcerated. The assumptions of juvenile justice would
have to be fundamentally changed.
Having demonstrated the effect ofjuvenile records on the application of Option I, we can turn to
a graphic display in Chart I of the effects of this
augmentation of information. The lower, unshaded
portion of each bar represents the percentage of
the cohort that would have been prevented from
committing the 1973 offense by a consideration of
the adult record only. The shaded upper portion
of the bar represents the fraction of the 342 cohort
members whose crimes would have been prevented
ifjuvenile felony records had been used as a basis
for the sentence. Note that while for Option I the
number of offenders incapacitated would have
been far greater than for any other policy, the
increase in incapacitation is proportionately far
greater in Options II and III when juvenile records
are considered. More crime is prevented when
juveniles are incapacitated like adults. This is a
conclusion that poses several possible explanations.
Is it because juveniles receive much shorter sentences-or no sentences at all? Or is it because the
juvenile records ofyoung adult offenders have been
sealed? The answers are to be found in the application of the Options to the new information
TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF PRIOR VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT FELONY

CONv

rcTiONS OF

126 ACCUSED

JUVENILE VIOLENT OFFENDERS, COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1973

of Prior

Number of Prior Violent
Convictions

Non-Violent

Total

Convictions

0

1

2

0
1

91
18

3
4

-

2

4

2

3

1

1

9

Total

1

115

-

10

1
-

94
22

7
2

-

1

126
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TABLE I I
THE IMPACT OF OPTION I* ON THE AMOUNT OF CRIME PREVENTED, ARREST LEVEL, AND CONVICTION LEVEL, BASED ON
COHORT OF

126

ACCUSED JUVENILE VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDERS

Persons PrePvented

vensons

Arrested

Arrested

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery
Sex Offenses (Violent)
Assault
Multiple Offenses (Two of the

Above)
Totals

Counts Prevented

1973 UCR,

__________________

Violent
Crimes

N

%of
Arrested

2
89
18
20

1
25
2
3

50.0
28.1
11.1
15.0

64
1508
295
755

3

2

66.7

-

126

33

26.2

2622

Arrest Level

Conviction Level

_____________

N

%of UCR

N

%ofUCR

1
26
4
4

1.6
1.7
1.3
0.5

I
18
3
5

1.6
1.2
1.0
0.7

-

-

-

-

35

1.3

27

1.0

'Option I: a five year net prison term imposed after any felony conviction; no violent felonies are required.
TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF SEVEN SENTENCING OPTIONS ON

1973

COHORT OF

126 JUVENILES

Measure of

Prevention

Persons
SetnigPrevented

________

%of
Cohort'

Sentencing

hags
Charges
Arrest

%of
UCR

Prevented

Conviction
ons%

Counts

of
UCR

Prevented

Option Number

I
33
II
14
III
6
IV
28
V
11
VI
8
VII
12
'The cohort consisted of 126 indictees.
2 There was a total of 2622 violent felonies

26.2
11.1
4.8
22.2
8.7
6.3
9.5

35
14
6
30
11
8
12

1.3
0.5
0.2
1.1
0.4
0.3
0.5

27
13
5
23
10
8
11

1.0
0.5
0.2
0.9
0.4
0.3
0.4

in Columbus in 1973.

Option I: One or more convictions, no prior violent felony, five year mandatory sentence.
Option II: Two or more convictions, no prior violent felony, five year mandatory sentence.
Option III: Three or more convictions, no prior violent felony, five year mandatory sentence.
Option IV: One or more convictions, no prior violent felony, three year mandatory sentence.
Option V: One or more convictions, one violent felony required, five year mandatory sentence.
Option VI: Two or more convictions, one violent felony required, five year mandatory sentence.
Option VII:Two or more convictions, no prior violent felony, three year mandatory sentence.
gained from inspection of the juvenile records for
this study.
As expected, the thirty individuals whose offenses would have been prevented by the application of Options I had their most recent conviction
while still juveniles. Under Option II, two recent

felonies were required. Thirty-nine additional offenders had been incapacitated, of whom twentythree had been most recently convicted asjuveniles.
The remaining sixteen persons had been incapacitated by a combination of one juvenile and one
adult prior offense. In Option III, which required
three previous felonies, only eight would still have
been incarcerated because ofjuvenile offenses. The
remainder, twenty-five offenders, would not have

qualified for Option III without the inclusion of
both juvenile and adult convictions. It is clear that
more 1973 violent offenses would have been pre-

vented by terms of incapacitation for under-age
offenders, and by counting juvenile convictions as
prior convictions. As to the feasibility or the propriety of a policy which would treat juvenile offenders in this way for relatively modest gains, we
decline to make a judgment at this point.
THE INCAPACITATION OF JUVENILES
We come now to a consideration of the volume
of crime that would be prevented if our Options
were applied to juvenile offenders just as they
would be to adults. The reader is reminded that
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this part of the study is not entirely congruent with
the study of the adult cohort which was drawn
from Franklin County statistics, since the juvenile
augmentation was limited to Columbus data.
In Table 8 we show the distribution of all juveniles arrested in 1973 for a violent felony. Of the
126 persons in this cohort, over two-thirds were
arrested for robbery. It will be observed that juveniles were arrested more frequently for robbery
than were the adults, and less frequently for homicide. It will also be noted that they were charged
with fewer offenses per person than were the adults.
The reasons may be found in juvenile court procedures, which lead to decisions without formally
introducing all charges against the individual. Of
the 126juveniles arrested, ninety-two, or 73%, were
convicted of a violent offense. This contrasts with
the conviction rate of 48.5% for the adults (see
Table 1).
In Table 9, it is seen that of the 2,622 violent
crimes reported in Columbus, 154 were cleared by
the arrest of our 126 juveniles-not quite 6%.
Turning to Table 11, we find that if we apply our
most severe sentencing policy, Option I, to these
126 juveniles, thirty-three, or 26.2% of the total
would have been prevented from committing their
1973 offense. That total compares closely with the
figure of 27.2% of the adult cohort of 342 whose
offenses would have been prevented, as shown in
Table 7. But these thirty-three individuals were
arrested for the commission of only thirty-five offenses, or 1.3% of the 2,622 violent offenses reported
and convicted of twenty-seven, or 1.0%.
In Table 12, the seven options are applied to the
juvenile data. Note that Option IV, calling for a
three-year rather than a five-year incapacitation,
reaches 22.2% of the cohort as compared with
Option I, which would incapacitate 26.2%. Clearly,
the slight difference between these two Options is
attributable to the fact that most juvenile criminal
activity is compressed into the later years of adolescence.
CONCLUSIONS

This study establishes the lower limits to the
effectiveness of various policies of incapacitationall of them far more stringent than any in actual
use in this country. Considering Option I only,
3.7% of the 2,892 violent offenses would have been
prevented, if we count as prevented only those
offenses where any of our 342 adults or 126 juve-

niles were found guilty of the offense and where
those convicted would have been subjected to the
five-year incapacitation. If it is assumed that all
those arrested in 1973 should have been convicted,
then 7.1% of the violent crime could have been
prevented.
Obviously these figures are too low. We cannot
determine how many of those arrested or those
convicted were responsible for an unknown number of additional crimes. We do know, however,
that there were a large number of persons in both
the adult and juvenile cohorts whose crimes could
not have been prevented by any policy of incapacitation. At least 93 of the juveniles and 231 of the
adults committed offenses for which a policy of
incapacitation would have been ineffective. How
many additional offenses these individuals were
responsible for is also a matter for speculation. It is
unlikely that these 342 adults and 126 juveniles
committed all of the 2,892 violent crimes of 1973,
but it is a fair guess that they committed more
than their known share. Even if we assume that the
incapacitated fraction of our two cohorts or persons
like them with prior felony convictions committed
four times as many violent offenses in 1973 than
they were actually arrested for-surely a maximum
assumption-only 28.4% of those 2,892 offenses
would have been prevented.
The policy on which the effectiveness of incapacitation was tested is extreme and intended to
catch as many recidivists as possible. The return is
modest. The economic costs of its application-to
say nothing of the social upheaval attendant on
such a radical change in our system of criminal
justice-are so great that we must conclude that
incapacitation is not a reasonable course to adopt
for the achievement of a reduction of violent crime.
As a proposed policy, incapacitation assumes the
existence of a small number of chronic offenders
who commit a disproportionately large volume of
violent offenses. From the research presented here,
it is clearly impossible to define the chronic offender in such a way that a practical basis for
crime reduction can be structured. Our strongest
test, Option I, really incapacitates all violators, not
just the chronic offenders. If the second felony
conviction is the criterion for chronicity, the prison
population will explode, but the benefits will probably be very meager. Any more liberal criterion,
such as two or more prior convictions will result in
very few serious offenders being caught in the net
which is spread.

